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I. INTRODUCTION
The law is gradually recognizing that the nonmarital' child
has the same legal rights as the marital child. A growing number
of United States Supreme Court decisions have applied the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to strike
down state statutes that discriminate against nonmarital chil-
dren.2 Many states have passed legislation expressly granting
nonmarital children legal equality with marital children.' Such
changes are especially necessary because as premarital sexual
activity has increased in recent years, so have out-of-wedlock
1. One commentator suggests that the terms "legitimate" and "illegitimate" be
replaced with "marital" and "nonmarital" because the former are discriminatory and
derogatory. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Propos-
als for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 53 n.228 (1975).
2. See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 18 (1983) (two-year state statute of limita-
tions violated nonmarital child's equal protection rights to recover child support); Mills
v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982) (one-year state statute of limitations violated
nonmarital child's equal protection rights to recover child support); Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (state intestate succession law that prohibited nonmarital chil-
dren from inheriting property violated equal protection when applied to a nonmarital
child whose father acknowledged her during his lifetime, but whose paternity was never
judicially determined); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974) (Social Security
Act provision covering entitlements to dependents of disabled parents violated equal
protection because it was both overinclusive and underinclusive with regard to
nonmarital dependents); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621
(1973) ("Assistance to Families of the Working Poor" program denied equal protection
to nonmarital children by limiting benefits to households in which the children's parents
were married); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (denial of support right to
nonmarital child violated equal protection under state law, even though no state statute
defined the natural father's support duty); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175-76 (1972) (state may not exclude nonmarital children from sharing equally with
other children in workers' compensation benefits following the death of their parent);
Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968) (state statute may
not deny a mother's recovery for the wrongful death of her nonmarital child); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (state may not create a right of action for the wrongful
death of a parent that is available solely to marital children).
3. See, e.g., those states that have adopted the Unif. Parentage Act: CAL. CIv. CODE
§§ 7000-7018 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1978); HAWAn REV.
STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51-.74 (West 1984); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -135 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 126.011-.391 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:17-38 to -59 (West 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (Supp. 1983); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 26.26.010-.905 (1983); WYO. STAT. §§ 14-7-101 to -126 (1977).
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pregnancy and childbearing." The Census Bureau reports that in
the last forty years the percentage of nonmarital births in the
United States has doubled;" the 1980 census reported 24,945
nonmarital children living in the State of Washington. Because
forty-five percent of children living in single-parent homes in
which the parent is female live below the federally determined
poverty level,7 a nonmarital birth affects not just the child, the
mother, and the alleged father, but the state taxpayers as well.
The first step in a nonmarital child's struggle for equality
usually is a legal determination of the child's father.' This Com-
ment focuses on paternity determinations and on the parties
who have an interest in those determinations. The defendant
has an interest in procedural protection because he may not be
the child's father.9 The child and the mother have an interest in
the child's monetary support. The state also has an interest in
the child's support because, according to one survey, more than
forty-five percent of all Aid to Families of Dependent Children
(AFDC) families have at least one nonmarital child."l
4. For example, the number of nonmarital births to women 20 years old rose from
18.7% of all births in the period from 1905-19 to 38.5% in the period from 1955-59. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984, at 70 (104th
ed. 1983) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS]. Although the proportion of out-of-wed-
lock first conceptions has stabilized, the tendency for women to marry in the event of a
premarital pregnancy or birth has sharply declined. Tanfer & Horn, Contraceptive Use,
Pregnancy and Fertility Patterns Among Single American Women in Their 20s, 17 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 10, 11 (Jan.-Feb. 1985).
5. STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS, supra note 4, at 70. The nonmarital fertility rate among
white teenagers increased by about one-third during the 1970s. In the late 1970s, out-of-
wedlock fertility increased among all women in their 20s. Tanfer & Horn, supra note 4,
at 10.
6. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION-DETAILED POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS: WASHINGTON at 159 (1983). Of women residing in Washington aged 15
to 44, 7.8% have had a nonmarital child. Id.
7. The federal government provides assistance to families in poverty through its Aid
to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The AFDC program is intended to
supply aid to children who are dependent because they "(have] been deprived of paren-
tal support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home . . . or
physical or mental incapacity of a parent." 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(1) (1983). Eighty-seven
percent of the children receiving benefits under the AFDC program are eligible for
AFDC because an absent parent is not providing adequate support. 129 CONG. REC. E163
(daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983) (statement of Hon. Mario Biaggi).
8. Proving maternity is rarely difficult. Thompson v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488, 495,
404 A.2d 269, 273 (1979) (paternity-determination statute not violative of equal protec-
tion when only the father's identity need be proved), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1062
(1980).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 93-139.
10. According to a 1973 AFDC survey of 2,989,891 families, 45.6% of all AFDC fam-
ilies had one or more nonmarital children; 25.3% had one nonmarital child; 10.8% had
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On two occasions, the State of Washington, through the
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), has sought
an administrative determination of paternity, basing its claim on
implied statutory authority.11 In both cases, the Washington
courts held that administrative determinations are not permit-
ted because such authority was neither express nor implied in
the statutory language. 2 Despite this conclusion, administrative
determinations of paternity are needed. The Washington State
Legislature should adopt a scheme that provides such hearings
in those situations in which the defendant's rights are not
compromised.
The state and all parties in a paternity proceeding may ben-
efit from a more efficient, administrative approach to paternity
adjudication if certain procedural safeguards are assured the
defendant. Section II of this Comment sketches the develop-
ment of common-law and statutory rights of paternity actions in
Washington. Section III examines the interests of each party in
a paternity action. Section IV discusses the advantages of an
administrative hearing. Section V suggests procedural safe-
guards for the defendant and proposes a framework for adminis-
trative determinations of paternity that is consistent with the
interests of all parties. Administrative hearings in such circum-
stances are preferable because the overwhelming number of
paternity actions are prosecuted by the state in an effort to
two nonmarital children; 1.2% had six or more nonmarital children; and 832 families had
10 or more nonmarital children. Of all the children in the AFDC survey, 32.7% were
born out of wedlock, an increase of 292% in the nonmarital children receiving AFDC in
just 12 years. Comment, Child Support Enforcement and Establishment of Paternity as
Tools of Welfare Reform-Social Services Amendments of 1974, pt. B, 42 U.S.C. § 651-
60 (Supp. V, 1975), 52 WASH. L. REV. 169, 177 n.59 (1976). While significant improve-
ments occurred in child-support collection in the decade following the Act's passage, the
Census Bureau surveys report that 40% of families supposedly entitled to support orders
do not have them. 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 305 (Oct. 23, 1984) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1981 (advance report)).
11. Taylor v. Morris, 88 Wash. 2d 586, 591, 564 P.2d 795, 797 (1977) (state con-
tended that support obligations enforced under WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.150 implied
right to determine paternity administratively); Woolery v. Department of Social &
Health Servs., 25 Wash. App. 762, 764, 612 P.2d 1, 2 (1980) (at an administrative hearing
held to recover public assistance pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 74.08.070, the state
asked for a determination of paternity of one dependent child). DSHS has no authority
to determine paternity administratively under WASH. REV. CODE ch. 74.20A, which gov-
erns the enforcement of support for financially dependent minor children. Taylor at 588,
564 P.2d at 796.
12. Taylor v. Morris, 88 Wash. 2d 586, 592, 564 P.2d 795, 798 (1977); Woolery v.
Department of Social & Health Servs., 25 Wash. App. 762, 764, 612 P.2d 1, 2 (1980).
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recover the funds that it expends on AFDC children."3 Adminis-
trative law judges specializing in paternity determinations would
provide prompt, efficient case handling in an informal, less
expensive environment.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON-LAW AND STATUTORY PATERNITY
ACTIONS IN WASHINGTON
In Washington, paternity actions are not monolithic in
nature. They arise as statutory" and common-law" causes of
action and include civil' 6 as well as criminal proceedings. 17
Paternity actions may be initiated by the child, the child's
guardian, the mother, the father or an alleged father, the state,
or any interested party.18
Underlying a child's right to bring a paternity action are
both the child's right to parental support and the state's interest
in requiring parents to support their children. Washington law
affords all children a right to parental support" that may be
13. Telephone interview with James W. Sherry, Program Director, Office of Support
Enforcement, Olympia, Wash. (Mar. 21, 1985).
14. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 26.26 (1983). "The superior courts have jurisdiction of an
action brought under this chapter. The action may be joined with an action for divorce,
dissolution, annulment, declaration of invalidity, separate maintenance, filiation, sup-
port, or any other civil action in which paternity is an issue including proceedings in
juvenile court." Id. § 26.26.080(1).
"The existence of this parental duty of parental support is also assumed although
not specifically stated, in statutes that provide civil and criminal sanctions for parents of
either sex, married or unmarried, who neglect that basic duty." State v. Wood, 89 Wash.
2d 97, 100, 569 P.2d 1148, 1150 (1977). See, e.g., Family Abandonment or Nonsupport
Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.20 (1983); Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA), WASH. REv. CODE ch. 26.21 (1983).
15. See Kaur v. Chawla, 11 Wash. App. 362, 365, 522 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1974)
(nonmarital child has judicially enforceable right to be supported by the child's natural
father that is separate from and in addition to marital child's statutory right to be
supported).
16. See supra note 14.
17. See Family Abandonment or Nonsupport Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.20 (1983).
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.060 (1983).
19. Historically, there was no common-law obligation on the part of a putative
father to support his nonmarital child. State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 298, 73 P. 375,
376 (1903). Even if the father of an out-of-wedlock child acknowledged his parentage in
writing, the father was not liable to the mother for support, absent an agreement. Hurst
v. Wagner, 181 Wash. 498, 500, 43 P.2d 964, 965 (1935). Originally, only the father was
given the duty of support and only the mother was given the remedy. State v. Tucker, 79
Wash. 2d 451, 452, 486 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1971). Today both parents are equally responsi-
ble for the care of their child, regardless of the legal relationship existing between the
parents. See Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1. See also State v.
Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 100, 569 P.2d 1148, 1150 (1977) ("A parent's obligation for the
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enforced in the courts. 20 Marital children may enforce this sup-
port right merely because of the established legal relationship
that exists between parent and child at the time of birth.21
Nonmarital children first face the more difficult task of estab-
lishing paternity in order to enforce their support right.22 In
most states, legislation has facilitated the procedure for deter-
mining paternity.2 Moreover, as a supplement to statutory law,
some states recognize a common-law right to support that is fun-
damental for all children.24
Washington recognizes paternity actions premised both on
the common-law fundamental right theory and on statutory
enactments. Although a nonmarital child's common-law right to
support was not recognized in Washington until 1974,25 pater-
nity statutes were enacted in 1881.26 The primary purpose of the
statutes was to establish the existence of the father-child rela-
tionship and thereby reduce the public burden of supporting
care and support of his or her child is a basic tenet recognized in this state without
reference to any particular statute."); State v. Booth, 15 Wash. App. 804, 809, 551 P.2d
1403, 1406 (1976) (the primary obligation for support and care of a child rests on the
child's parents and not on the taxpayers of this state); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.130(5)
(1983) (amount of child support determined by considering needs of child and abilities of
parents).
20. Kaur v. Chawla, 11 Wash. App. 362, 363, 522 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1974) (both mari-
tal and nonmarital children have a common-law right to judicially enforceable support
by their natural fathers).
21. See Van Tinker v. Van Tinker, 38 Wash. 2d 390, 391, 229 P.2d 333, 334 (1951)
(the support obligation is one created by common law). See also Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973). In Gomez, the United States Supreme Court recognized that all children
have a fundamental right to parental support. The Gomez Court held that once a state
granted marital children an enforceable right to parental support, it could not deny such
a right to nonmarital children. Id. at 537-38.
22. State v. Booth, 15 Wash. App. 804, 808, 551 P.2d 1403, 1406 (1976) (upon a legal
determination that a man is the father of a child born out of wedlock, the father's obliga-
tion to provide support is the same as if his child had been born in lawful wedlock).
23. Statutes have been enacted in most jurisdictions creating judicial proceedings to
establish the paternity of a nonmarital child and to compel the father to contribute to
the child's support. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 685, 691 (1974).
24. See, e.g., Huss v. DeMott, 215 Kan. 450, 453, 524 P.2d 743, 744 (1974) (obliga-
tion to support both marital and nonmarital children arises from the state's public pol-
icy); State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d 808, 811, 498 P.2d 877, 879 (1972) (in an action based
on filiation statute court stated that the marital relationship is unnecessary to establish a
duty of child support).
25. See Kaur v. Chawla, 11 Wash. App. 362, 363, 522 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1974) (for
first time in Washington, court held that putative father has a support duty based on
common law rather than on a statutory cause of action).
26. The history of Washington's filiation statutes has been traced to the original
bastardy statute enacted as a part of 1881 Wash. Laws §§ 1214-1221. State v. Coffey, 77
Wash. 2d 630, 632, 465 P.2d 665, 667 (1970).
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nonmarital children. 27  This same purpose underlies current
law.28 In addition to the support function, however, paternity
statutes serve other purposes: to establish the custody and
guardianship of the child;" to establish visitation privileges with
the child; 30 to protect the child's status as an heir;31 and to assist
the mother in fulfilling her child support, care, and education
obligations.
2
In contrast to the early statutory recognition of a paternity
cause of action, the United States Supreme Court did not recog-
nize a nonmarital child's right to paternal support until 1973. 3s
In Gomez v. Perez,34 the Court held that once a state granted
marital children an enforceable right to paternal support, it
could not deny such a right to nonmarital children without vio-
lating the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.3 5 This holding was reinforced in Washington in Kaur v.
Chawla,36 in which the court of appeals asserted that because
the common law entitles marital children to judicially enforcea-
ble support by their natural fathers, nonmarital children are
27. State v. Walker, 87 Wash. 2d 443, 445, 553 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1976) ("The pur-
poses of a filiation action are two: (1) determination of paternity; and (2) imposition of a
support obligation if the accused is found to be the father of the child."); State v. Pear-
son, 13 Wash. App. 870, 873, 538 P.2d 567, 569 (1975) (purpose of a filiation proceeding
is to fix paternity and to establish the legal obligation of support).
28. State v. Booth, 15 Wash. App. 804, 809, 551 P.2d 1403, 1406 (1976) ("The pri-
mary obligation [of support] is on [the nonmarital child's] parents and not on the tax-
payers of this State. The obligation of a financially able father to pay [support should
not be] excused for the reason that these necessities are being provided by the State's
public assistance program.").
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.130(3) (1983) ("The judgment and order shall contain
other appropriate provisions . . . concerning . . . the custody and guardianship of the
child .... ").
30. Id. ("The judgment and order shall contain other appropriate provisions . . .
concerning . . . visitation privileges with the child .... ").
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.081 (1983) ("For the purpose of inheritance to,
through, and from any child, the effects and treatment of the parent-child relationship
shall not depend upon whether or not the parents have been married."). See also State v.
James, 38 Wash. App. 264, 266, 686 P.2d 1097, 1098 (1984) (father's estate subject to
nonmarital child's claim to inheritance, worker's compensation benefits, and insurance
proceeds).
32. State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d 808, 809, 498 P.2d 877, 878 (1972).
33. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
34. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
35. Id. at 538 ("[O]nce a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of chil-
dren to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient
justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural
father has not married its mother.").
36. 11 Wash. App. 362, 522 P.2d 1198 (1974).
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similarly entitled.37 The Kaur court concluded that a child's
right to support is fundamental; once paternity has been estab-
lished, the nonmarital child's right to support is coextensive
with that of the marital child.8
The child's right to compel paternal support in Washington
continues throughout the child's minority.39 As a consequence of
characterizing the child's support right as fundamental and con-
tinuing throughout minority, the Washington courts gradually
have moved away from a statute of limitations on paternity
actions.40 In so doing, the courts have relied primarily on the
public policy reasons underlying the enactment of paternity
statutes.4 1 Furthermore, Washington's tolling of the statute of
limitations was based on constitutional grounds"2 and now is
supported by federal statutory enactments.' Because no limita-
tion of action exists on the marital child's ability to enforce the
support right,"' a state's application of a statute of limitations to
paternity actions potentially allows different treatment of two
classes of children.4  Equal protection challenges 6 to such state
37. Id. at 364, 522 P.2d at 1199.
38. Id.
39. Nettles v. Beckley, 32 Wash. App. 606, 608, 648 P.2d 508, 510 (1982) (statute of
limitations is tolled during the child's minority).
40. State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d 808, 811, 498 P.2d 877, 879 (1972) (putative father
should not escape liability for child support if no filiation proceeding is instituted within
the two-year statutory period; there is no similar limitation upon the time within which
the prosecutor can bring an action to enforce criminal nonsupport); In re Burley, 33
Wash. App. 629, 636, 658 P.2d 8, 11-12 (1983) (fact that a minor child's date of birth is
before effective date of Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) does not prevent child from bring-
ing paternity action under that statute); Nettles v. Beckley, 32 Wash. App. 606, 607-08,
648 P.2d 508, 509-10 (1982) (UPA does not limit time for commencing paternity action,
and child may recover back support from his natural father); Kaur, 11 Wash. App. at
363, 522 P.2d at 1199 (a statute of limitations that might otherwise protect defendant's
interests is not an impenetrable barrier that limits child's right to a paternity
determination).
41. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall .. deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("No law shall
be passed granting to any citizen . . . privileges or immunities which upon the same
terms shall not equally belong to all citizens . ). See infra notes 46-47 and accompa-
nying text.
43. Congress has answered questions left open by Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1
(1983), and by Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982), regarding the minimum length of
a statute of limitations for paternity actions. The 1984 amendments to the Social Secur-
ity Act require that a state must allow establishment of paternity at least until a child's
18th birthday. Act of Aug. 16, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305, 1307 (to be codi-
fied as 42 U.S.C. § 666(c)).
44. Kaur, 11 Wash. App. at 364, 522 P.2d at 1199.
45. For a comprehensive analysis of the various statutes of limitations provisions
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legislative classifications have been successful. 47
When the statute of limitations is tolled during the child's
minority, the child ' becomes the real party in interest in a
paternity proceeding.4 9 The child's interests in determining his
or her natural father and obtaining financial support50 outweigh
the interests of other parties, including the state's interest in
securing a support obligor,5" the mother's interest in settling the
claim, 2 and the defendant's interest in procedural fairness. 53
The Washington Legislature and the courts have delicately bal-
anced the interests of the parties in paternity actions by adopt-
ing the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). 4 The recognition that
the child's interest is superior, however, need not leave the other
parties unprotected.
adopted in the United States and their effect on the rights of nonmarital children, see
Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Paternity Proceedings: Barring an "Illegitimate's"
Right to Support, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 567, 576-80 (1983).
46. The United States Supreme Court considered whether a nonmarital child's
equal protection rights were violated by a statute of limitations applied to the child's
support suit for the first time in Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 100 (1982).
47. E.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 18 (1983) (a two-year limitations period failed
to provide a nonmarital child, who was not covered by one of the exceptions in the Ten-
nessee statute, with an adequate opportunity to obtain support); Mills v. Hahluetzel, 456
U.S. 91, 99 (1982). In Mills, the Court appears to permit a shorter statutory period for
the nonmarital child, compared with the marital child, as long as the statutory period is
"sufficient." The Court failed to consider the state's interest in reducing the public's
financial burden of supporting nonmarital children. Comment, supra note 45, at 600.
48. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488, 499, 404 A.2d 269, 275 (1979)
(statute of limitations designed primarily to assure fairness to defendants in paternity
proceedings), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1062 (1980); Kaur v. Chawla, 11 Wash. App.
362, 363, 522 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1974) (a statute of limitations that might otherwise pro-
tect the interests of defendants may not be an impenetrable barrier that limits a child's
right to a paternity determination).
49. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The financial support due to the
child from the father is determined under WASH. REv. CODE § 26.26.130(5) (1983) by
considering only those factors that relate to the child's needs. One Washington court
held recently that a parent's contract claims (breach of contract to use contraceptive
measures) or tort claims (negligent use or misrepresentation of actual use) could not be
considered by the court in setting child support. Linda D. v. Fritz C., 38 Wash. App. 288,
687 P.2d 223 (1984). To do so would be discriminatory against nonmarital children. Id.
at 296, 687 P.2d at 227.
51. For a discussion of the state's interests as a party to a paternity proceeding, see
infra text accompanying notes 140-58.
52. For a discussion of the mother's interests as a party to a paternity proceeding,
see infra text accompanying notes 82-92.
53. For a discussion of the defendant's interests as a party to a paternity proceed-
ing, see infra text accompanying notes 93-139.
54. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 579 (1979). In Washington, the amended act is
found at WASH. REv. CODE ch. 26.26 (1983).
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III. INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES IN A PATERNITY ACTION
The statutory scheme developed by the State of Washing-
ton represents a legislative attempt to balance the interests of
the parties in a disputed paternity proceeding. Washington's
adoption of the UPA in 1976 provides the basis for this interest
balancing. In Washington, the child is perceived as the real
party in interest in a paternity determination. 5 The child's
superior interest is not questioned here because it is firmly
rooted in the common-law concept that all children have a right
to parental support.56 The other parties in a paternity determi-
nation, however, have interests that may be advanced and pro-
tected without diminishing the child's superior interest.5"
An example of balancing all parties' interests in a paternity
action is found in the UPA's treatment of a statute of limita-
tions. The UPA effectively eliminated such limitations58 in an
attempt to balance the rights of the child against the state's
interest in preventing stale and fraudulent claims.59 Although
55. State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 102, 569 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1977) (filiation pro-
ceeding designed for the benefit of the child, not for the benefit of the mother); State v.
Kline, 69 Wash. 2d 107, 109, 417 P.2d 348, 350 (1966) (the object of the filiation proceed-
ing is to ensure support for the child, not to punish the defendant). But cf. In re Burley,
33 Wash. App. 629, 639, 658 P.2d 8, 14 (1983) (paternity proceedings may be initiated by
the state to recover expenditures of public assistance funds for a child's care; in these
circumstances the state is the real party in interest).
56. See, e.g., Nettles v. Beckley, 32 Wash. App. 606, 607-08, 648 P.2d 508, 509-10
(1982) (nonmarital child has common-law right to bring an action on his own behalf to
establish paternity).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 82-139.
58. "[A]n action brought by or on behalf of a child whose paternity has not been
determined is not barred until [three] years after the child reaches the age of majority."
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 7, 9A U.L.A. 596 (1979). See also id. commissioners' comment
(because statute of limitations is tolled for 21 years, "it is fully understood that such an
extended statute of limitations will cause problems of proof in many cases"). The Wash-
ington Legislature chose not to adopt § 7.
59. Both the nonmarital child and the defendant have an interest in procedures that
are designed to provide an accurate determination of paternity. Historically, because of
proof problems and society's interest in fixing parentage, the paternity defendant had an
onerous task to prove his innocence. This difficulty persists because reliable eyewitnesses
to intimate sexual activity are rare, and the problem of perjured testimony in paternity
proceedings is particularly acute. See Larson, Blood Test Exclusion Procedures in
Paternity Litigation: The Uniform Acts and Beyond, 13 J. FAM. L. 713, 713 (1973). In
order to reduce the defendant's proof problems, which multiply with the passage of time,
to prevent the litigation of stale and fraudulent claims, and to encourage an early deter-
mination of paternity, some states have enacted statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Thomp-
son v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488, 499, 404 A.2d 269, 275 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S.
1062 (1980); State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d 808, 811, 498 P.2d 877, 879 (1972).
Statutes of limitation recently have been challenged in the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
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the UPA approach makes sense because the child requires sup-
port until majority and because during that time and thereafter
the child is entitled to collateral parental benefits,60 the
approach may leave the defendant in a procedurally insecure
position. 1 Statutes of limitation encourage an early determina-
Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 3 (1983) (Tennessee statute); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S.
91, 97 (1982) (Texas statute). For a statute of limitations on paternity determination to
survive 14th amendment constitutional attack, it must provide nonmarital children with
an adequate opportunity to obtain support and must be substantially related to a legiti-
mate state interest. Mills, 456 U.S. at 98. But one commentator persuasively argues that
statutes of limitations contain two significant deficiencies that render them impermissi-
bly overbroad when applied to a nonmarital child's cause of action:
First, statutes of limitations impose an arbitrary and formidable impediment
to the enforcement of the illegitimate child's right to support without regard to
"alternatives which deal directly with the problem of proof. Although proof of
paternity may become more difficult with the passage of time, this mere possi-
bility cannot be allowed to work an unconstitutional discrimination against
illegitimate children." Instead of narrowly focusing on alternative procedures
aimed at reducing the problems of proof inherent in paternity actions, the stat-
ute of limitations imposes an arbitrary time period within which a paternity
action must be brought and, thereby, severely limits the illegitimate child's
ability to enforce support rights. Second, because a child's right to support is
continuing and because a determination of paternity is required before an ille-
gitimate child may enforce the right to support, an action to determine pater-
nity can never become stale. Moreover, a child's right to support is never "dor-
mant"; the statute of limitations thus is an illogical foreclosure on the ability
of illegitimate children to enforce a continuing right to support.
Comment, supra note 45, at 605-06 (quoting State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs. v. West, 378 So. 2d 1220, 1227 (Fla. 1979)). The direction that the Supreme Court
has chosen in Mills and Pickett supports this assertion. The Court has said that statutes
of limitations of one or two years are insufficient to allow the child to assert his or her
rights to support. Pickett, 462 U.S. at 18 (Court struck down two-year limit); Mills, 456
U.S. at 101 (Court struck down one-year limit).
The controversy surrounding statutes of limitations in paternity actions has been
mooted by Congress' adoption of the 1984 Social Security Act Amendments. States now
are required to extend the statute of limitations for paternity actions and to compel
support until the child's 18th birthday. Act of Aug. 16, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat.
1305, 1307 (to be codified as 42 U.S.C. § 666(c)) ("[Tjhe state shall have in effect all of
the laws to improve child support enforcement effectiveness . . . . [Elach state must
have in effect laws requiring . . . the following procedures . . . . Procedures which per-
mit the establishment of the paternity of any child at any time prior to such child's
eighteenth birthday.").
60. See supra note 2.
61. The UPA gives the child the right to bring an action for back child support.
Nettles v. Beckley, 32 Wash. App. 606, 609, 648 P.2d 508, 510 (1982). But cf. Hartman v.
Smith, 100 Wash. 2d 766, 768-69, 674 P.2d 176, 178 (1984). In Hartman, the custodial
parent remarried and the stepfather adopted the child. Seven years later the court of
appeals declared the adoption void ab initio. The natural father then resumed making
support payments; the mother claimed that the child support and medical expenses that
had accrued during the seven-year period of presumed adoption were now owed to her
by the father. The court determined that the father's failure to pay support did not
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tion of paternity62 and relieve the defendant of the potentially
onerous burden of defending against accusations after the pas-
sage of many years.6 3 However, the UPA counterbalances this
procedural insecurity: if a man is aware of a possible paternity
action, or if he is a presumed father but can rebut the presump-
tion, then he may bring an action to disestablish paternity.
4
Adding to the defendant's procedural insecurity, the UPA
attempts to balance the mother's interest and the child's inter-
est in support against the inherent proof problems in paternity
actions.65 Typically, a mother has little difficulty establishing a
prima facie case without corroborating witnesses,'66.whereas any
defenses that the defendant might offer require extensive cor-
roboration. 7 Furthermore, the UPA allows certain facts to raise
a presumption of paternity that can be rebutted only by clear
and convincing evidence.6
Finally, the UPA again counterbalances the defendant's
procedural insecurity by protecting the indigent defendant with
appointed counsel, blood tests, and a transcript on appeal, all
furnished at state expense. 9 Adopting states, however, have not
injure the mother-custodian or the child because the child was well cared for during this
time. Furthermore, the father had relied on the validity of the adoption and was denied
all parental rights for a significant period of time. Thus, although recognizing that a
marital dissolution order and judgment requires the noncustodial parent to pay child
support and that the cause of action for unpaid past due support lies with the custodial
parent alone, the Hartman court applied equitable principles to relieve the natural
father of past due support.
62. State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d 808, 811, 498 P.2d 877, 879 (1972).
63. See Thompson v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488, 494, 404 A.2d 269, 272 (1979) (claims
asserted after evidence is gone, memories have faded, and witnesses disappeared are so
stale as to be unjust), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1062 (1980).
64. These provisions are retained by Washington. See WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26.060(1)(a) (1983) (alleged father may bring action to disestablish paternity at any
time); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.060(1)(b) (1983) (presumed father may bring action to
disestablish paternity "within a reasonable time" after obtaining knowledge of relevant
facts).
65. See Larson, supra note 59, at 733, 752.
66. For example, the mother need only establish the prima facie fact of sexual inter-
course between the parties during the appropriate time period for the court to require
that the putative father submit to a blood test. State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 741,
612 P.2d 795, 799 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.100(1) (1983).
67. Larson, supra note 59, at 715 (defendant's testimony as to the defenses of non-
access, sterility, impotency, or multiple-access usually requires extensive corroboration).
68. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(b), 9A U.L.A. 591 (1979) ("A presumption under this
section may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evi-
dence."). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040(5) (1983) (requiring "clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence").
69. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 11, 9A U.L.A. 601 (1979) ("The court may... require
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always retained each of these provisions and have thereby
altered the balance.70
For example, the Washington Legislature deleted the provi-
sion in the UPA requiring appointed counsel for indigents at
state expense. Two subsequent Washington cases held that no
constitutional right to appointed counsel exists." In the more
recent of these cases, State v. James,72 the court concluded that
appointed counsel is not constitutionally required in all state-
initiated paternity proceedings.73
The James court applied a three-part test 7' to determine
when due process requires a certain procedural safeguard.75 The
reviewing court must consider: (1) the value of the private inter-
est that would be affected by the private action; (2) the risk of
an erroneous adjudication absent the procedural safeguard; and
the child, mother, or alleged father to submit to blood tests."). See also id. § 19, 9 U.L.A.
611 (1979), which provides:
(a) At the pretrial hearing and in further proceedings, any party may be
represented by counsel. The court shall appoint counsel for a party who is
financially unable to obtain counsel.
(b) If a party is financially unable to pay the cost of a transcript, the court
shall furnish on request a transcript for purposes of appeal.
70. Of the ten adopting states, four have retained the original language or intent of
Uniform Parentage Act § 19. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-119 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §
126.201 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-18 (1981); WYO. STAT. § 14-7-120 (1977). Wash-
ington deleted the section. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
71. State v. Walker, 87 Wash. 2d 443, 553 P.2d 1093 (1976); State v. James, 38
Wash. App. 264, 686 P.2d 1097 (1984). In Walker, the Washington Supreme Court held
that an indigent person has a constitutional right to free legal counsel only in an action
that involves an imminent threat of imprisonment; the mere possibility of imprisonment
for failure to follow a court order in the proceeding does not constitute such a threat.
Walker, 87 Wash. 2d at 446, 553 P.2d at 1095. However, the court of appeals in James
indicated that Walker was no longer persuasive authority because the three factors in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), see infra text accompanying notes 74-76,
were controlling with respect to federal due process requirements. The Walker court had
failed to analyze the right to counsel issue in accordance with those factors. Furthermore,
the Walker court assumed that because paternity proceedings did not result in an immi-
nent threat of imprisonment, a right to counsel did not apply. In James, however, the
court regarded the lack of imminent imprisonment as merely giving rise to a rebuttable
presumption against the right to counsel. James, 38 Wash. App. at 272 n.4, 686 P.2d at
1101 n.4.
72. 38 Wash. App. 264, 686 P.2d 1097 (1984).
73. Id. at 269, 686 P.2d at 1100.
74. Id. at 267, 686 P.2d at 1099. This test was originally set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
75. Paternity proceedings are subject to the requirements of due process. Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (indigent defendants in paternity proceedings entitled
to blood-grouping tests furnished at state expense). See infra notes 110-18 and accompa-
nying text.
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(3) the government's interest in providing or withholding the
procedural safeguard. These three factors are then weighed
against the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to
counsel only when he may be imprisoned if he loses."6
Applying these factors to the James defendant, the court
concluded that the first factor-the interests of the putative
father affected by the paternity action-weigh in favor of recog-
nizing a right to appointed counsel. Both the accuracy of the
paternity determination and the defendant's financial interests
are compelling."7 The second factor-the risk of an erroneous
adjudication absent appointed counsel-depends on the circum-
stances of each case. Although recent developments in blood
testing methods78 have increased the probability of accurate
paternity determinations, this evidence alone may not be conclu-
sive.79 Finally, in applying the third factor-the state's interest
in providing or withholding the procedural safeguard-the court
recognized that the interests of both the state and the defendant
were served when the defendant was represented by counsel.
The state, however, also has legitimate financial interests at
stake.8 0 After weighing these three factors with the presumption
against appointed counsel in paternity proceedings, the James
court concluded that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment does not require appointed counsel in all state-initi-
ated proceedings.8 1 Thus, although the court of appeals found
that appointed counsel was not required in the circumstances of
the James defendant, the decision permits a case-by-case deter-
mination of this problematic issue in future decisions.
In attempting to protect a defendant's procedural interests,
the UPA weighs his rights against those of the other parties.
Washington's adaptation of the UPA has altered that balance,
76. James, 38 Wash. App. at 268, 686 P.2d at 1099.
77. A defendant may have liberty interests at stake as well. See Tetro v. Tetro, 86
Wash. 2d 252, 253, 544 P.2d 17, 18 (1975) (father faces possible imprisonment for con-
tempt if he fails to make support payments); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.20.030 (1983) (pater-
nity adjudication may be basis for criminal prosecution for willful nonsupport); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.26.070 (1983) (plaintiff may petition court for arrest warrant for putative
father even before defendant is adjudicated the father). However, subsequent actions
based on the paternity determination would entitle the indigent defendant to appointed
counsel. James, 38 Wash. App. at 272, 686 P.2d at 1101. See infra notes 125-36 and
accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
79. James, 38 Wash. App. at 272, 686 P.2d at 1101.
80. Id. at 271, 686 P.2d at 1100.
81. Id. at 272, 686 P.2d at 1101.
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giving even greater weight to the child's superior interests.
Because both the defendant and the child have an interest in
the accurate determination of paternity, the child's superior
interests are preserved, while the defendant's interest in repre-
sentation is recognized and protected.
A. The Mother
The UPA recognizes that the mother and child often have
divergent interests. Therefore, the UPA provides that only a
person who will objectively represent the best interests of the
child, excluding the mother and alleged father, be appointed
guardian ad litem. 82 At those times when the interests of the
mother and the child collide, the child's interest prevails.
For example, a mother's interests may diverge from those of
her child when the mother wishes to settle the claim in order to
obtain immediate monetary support83 or when a mother refrains
from bringing an action in the hopes of continuing a relationship
with the child's father.8 4 Some mothers may fear for their physi-
cal safety. Others may be embarrassed and reluctant to publicly
reveal the pregnancy because of a desire to avoid disapproval of
family and community" or because the pregnancy was the result
of incest. In Washington, although a mother may have good rea-
sons for not bringing suit, she is not permitted to foreclose her
nonmarital child's right to support by either compromise86 or
inaction."
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.090 (1983). But see WASH. REV. CODE § 74.20.310 (1983)
(a guardian ad litem need not be appointed in actions brought by the attorney general on
behalf of DSHS, the child, or the mother; or in actions referred by DSHS and brought by
the prosecutor on behalf of the state, the child, or the mother).
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.060(3) (1983) ("Regardless of its terms, no agreement
between an alleged or presumed father and the mother or child, shall bar an action
under this section."). But cf. State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d 808, 815, 498 P.2d 877, 881
(1972) (a compromise and settlement of a paternity claim can be sustained if the consid-
eration paid is at least as much as the law would require in a filiation proceeding); Peter-
son v. Eritslund, 69 Wash. 2d 588, 592, 419 P.2d 332, 334-35 (1966) (if alleged father
obtains release from mother upon payment of a sum greater than the court would have
required following a filiation proceeding, the agreement is binding).
84. See Thompson v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488, 494, 404 A.2d 269, 273 (1979), appeal
dismissed, 444 U.S. 1062 (1980).
85. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 100 (1982).
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.060(3) (1983). See also State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d
808, 814-15, 498 P.2d 877, 881 (1972) (father's obligation to contribute to child's support
may not be defeated by mother's agreement not to assert a claim against him).
87. Even when a statute of limitations in paternity actions was recognized in Wash-
ington, a putative father could not escape liability for child support if no filiation pro-
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A mother who has no desire to bring suit may again have
her interests overridden if she applies for public assistance.88
The mother-applicant must cooperate in establishing paternity
by naming the father if she knows his identity, by assisting in
locating him, and by participating as the local law requires to
establish his legal obligation. 9 In order to encourage her partici-
pation, DSHS will deny the portion of AFDC payments ordina-
rily provided for the caretaker parent if she does not cooper-
ate.90 The child may not be deprived of aid because of the
mother's failure to cooperate, 91 and the mother cannot be com-
pelled to cooperate if she can show that such cooperation would
not be in the best interests of the child.92
ceeding was instituted within the statutory period. State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d 808, 811,
498 P.2d 877, 879 (1972).
88. The Child Support and Establishment of Paternity provisions, part D of title IV
of the Social Security Act, require of each participating state that a designated agency
obtain and enforce support orders for AFDC children and establish paternity when nec-
essary. 42 U.S.C. § 652 (1983). In Washington, the agency so designated is the Washing-
ton State Department of Social and Health Services. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.20.040
(1983).
89. 45 C.F.R. § 232.12 (1984).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B)(ii) (1983); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-24-108(2) (1983).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 606(f) (1983). Congress recently passed legislation that allows $50
per month of child support collected from the absent parent to be paid to the AFDC
family, rather than to the state. The intent of this incentive was to give greater benefits
to families, while encouraging those families to cooperate in child support enforcement.
130 CONG. REC. S13757-58 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
92. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-24-111(6) (1983) provides:
[Clooperation in establishing paternity and/or securing support is against the
best interest of the child only if:
(a) The applicant's/recipient's cooperation is reasonably anticipated to
result in physical harm or emotional harm which clearly demonstrates observa-
ble consequences substantially impairing the functioning of either:
(i) The child for whom support is to be sought; or
(ii) The parent or caretaker relative with whom the child is living which
reduces the parent or caretaker relative's capacity to care for the child ade-
quately; or
(b) At least one of the following circumstances exists, and . . . because of
the existence of that circumstance . . .proceeding to establish paternity or
secure support would be detrimental to the child for whom support would be
sought:
(i) The child for whom support is sought was conceived as a result of
incest or forcible rape;
(ii) Legal proceedings for the adoption of the child are pending before a
superior court; or
(iii) The applicant/recipient is currently being assisted by a public or
licensed child-placing agency to resolve the issue of whether to keep the child
or relinquish it for adoption, and the discussions have not gone on for more
than three months.
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B. The Defendant
Because of the danger that the court might wrongly name
the defendant as the child's father, the defendant in a paternity
action is granted certain procedural protections. Probably the
most important of these is the defendant's right to a blood
test. 3 Because of the scientific advancements in blood grouping
and typing, there is now general agreement that these results
should be admitted into evidence. 4
Two kinds of testing procedures95 have been used to deter-
mine if a defendant is excludable from the class of possible
fathers: one procedure is based on blood groups and types; the
other on genetic make-up. The blood-group-and-type tests96 are
more commonly used because they are less expensive than the
genetic tests97 and because a proper scientific foundation has
been laid, thus increasing the chance of admittance at trial.9 8
However, the results of the blood-group-and-type tests are less
accurate and less discriminating than those afforded by the sec-
ond procedure. 99
The second procedure, known as the human leukocyte anti-
gen (HLA) test, is based on gene typing. This procedure dramat-
ically reduces the chance of an inaccurate result in determining
parentage' l 0 because HLA types occur with greater variety in
93. See, e.g., Lyons v. DeValk, 47 Wis. 2d 200, 205, 177 N.W.2d 106, 108-09 (1970)
(mother's refusal to submit to scientific testing deprives the defendant of his due process
right to a defense and is a ground for dismissal).
94. A majority of states have enacted statutes authorizing the use of blood-group
tests. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.100 (Supp. 1984). See also S. SCHATKIN, Dis-
PUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 9.13 (Supp. 1984).
95. For a complete discussion of the nature and reliability of blood and genetic tests
used in determining paternity, see generally S. SCHATKIN, supra note 94, §§ 5.01-11.06
(discussion of the characteristics and accuracy of both blood group and human leukocyte
antigen (HLA) testing); Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases
Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1977-78) (discussion of the characteris-
tics and superior accuracy of the HLA procedure); Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present
Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976)
(blood tests that exclude the defendant are the most probative evidence for the putative
father in a paternity proceeding); Comment, Paternity Testing with Human Leukocyte
Antigen: A Medicolegal Breakthrough, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 511 (1980).
96. These tests are based on the scientific determination that all human blood falls
within four groups and three types. See S. SCHATKIN, supra note 94, § 5.02. The proce-
dure is reliable only to exclude a defendant as a possible father; it does not prove pater-
nity because the combination of blood and group types appears in millions of men.
97. See S. SCHATKIN, supra note 94, § 9.01, at 188.
98. Id. at § 9.03.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
100. Studies indicate that if a putative father is not excluded by the HLA test, the
[Vol. 8:653
Paternity Determinations
the human population than do blood types and groups."0 ' For
example, if a putative father shares a combination of HLA types
with a child that are not also found in the child's mother, then
there is a statistically high probability that the defendant is the
child's father.'"" The converse of this proposition provides excul-
patory evidence for the defendant. Thus, if a putative father
lacks a combination of HLA types found in the child that are
not also found in the child's mother, then the accused defendant
cannot be the child's father.103
When the Washington Legislature adopted the UPA, it
retained the blood test provision.'0 4 Although the provision does
not specify the administration of the more sophisticated HLA
genetic testing, in those actions involving court-ordered blood
testing, HLA testing has been used exclusively for some time.'0 5
Either the blood-group-and-type test or the HLA test is now
dispositive on the issue of nonpaternity, except when the state's
presumption of legitimacy precludes these tests.1 06 While exclu-
sions of paternity can be established with scientific certainty,
inclusions of paternity may only be established by degrees of
probability. 10 7  Even so, blood-typing and HLA gene-typing
results should be admissible as evidence to be weighed with
other circumstantial evidence.' 08 Washington permits the admis-
sion of the blood test results for purposes of inclusion as well as
probability of his being the child's father is likely to exceed 90%. Terasaki, supra note
95, at 552-53.
101. Id. at 544.
102. Comment, supra note 95, at 521.
103. Id.
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.100 (Supp. 1984) ("The court may, and upon request
of a party shall, require the child, mother, and any alleged father who has been made a
party to submit to blood tests."); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 10, 9A U.L.A. 579 (1979).
105. See, e.g., State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 737, 612 P.2d 795, 796 (1980).
106. Miller v. Sybouts, 97 Wash. 2d 445, 449-50, 645 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1982) (prior to
establishing paternity by another man, a divorced husband must disestablish his pre-
sumed fatherhood of a child born within three hundred days after the marriage is termi-
nated); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040(5) (1983).
107. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 127 (1971).
108. Id. Professor Krause asserts that the issue of paternity should be viewed less as
a legal question and more as a medical question. Id. at 123. "[E]ven if blood typing
cannot establish paternity positively in medical terms, the positive proof of paternity
may reach a level of probability which is entirely acceptable in legal terms." Id. at 128
(emphasis in original).
If a putative father receives HLA blood type results that place him in Column A,
then his likelihood of fathering the child is described in Column B.
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exclusion.' 9
The indigent paternity defendant has a right to state-sup-
ported testing"0 even though the Washington courts have ruled
that indigent paternity defendants have no right to appointed
counsel at state expense."' The issue of the indigent paternity
defendant's due process right to have at least one objective and
reliable method of proving paternity made available to him was
decided by the United States Supreme Court in Little v.
Streater."2 The Court noted that blood grouping is a reliable
and objective method of determining parentage because of three
factors: (1) one's blood group can be determined at birth; (2) the
blood group remains constant throughout life; and (3) the blood
group is inherited by the child from the parents." 3 The results
of such testing may provide exculpatory evidence for the defen-
dant."41 Thus, the Court concluded that denial by a state of such
potentially valuable evidence constitutes a violation of the
defendant's due process rights." 5
Under a narrow reading of Little, blood testing may be
A. Probability Percentage B. Likelihood of Paternity
99.80 - 99.90 Practically proved
99.10 - 99.79 Extremely likely
95.00 - 99.09 Very likely
90.00 - 94.99 Likely
80.00 - 89.99 Undecided
< 80.00 Not useful
Adapted from S. SCHATKIN, supra note 94, § 8.13, at 116 (Supp. 1984). Cf. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257.62(5) (West 1982 & Supp. 1984) ("If the results of the blood test indicate that
the likelihood of the alleged father's paternity is more than 92 percent, upon motion the
court shall order the alleged father to pay temporary child support. . . [while awaiting]
the results of the paternity proceedings.").
109. See, e.g., State v. James, 38 Wash. App. 264, 265, 686 P.2d 1097, 1097 (1984);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.100(1) (Supp. 1984) ("The expert's verified report identifying
the blood characteristics observed is admissible in evidence in any hearing or trial in the
parentage action.").
110. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (unanimous decision).
111. State v. Walker, 87 Wash. 2d 443, 446, 553 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1976); State v.
James, 38 Wash. App. 264, 269, 686 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1984). See supra notes 71-81 and
accompanying text.
112. 452 U.S. 1 (1981). Little involved the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute
requiring the party who requested blood tests in a paternity determination to pay for
them. The Court held that the denial of such tests to an indigent defendant was a viola-
tion of his due process rights under the 14th amendment. Id. at 16-17.
113. Id. at 6-7.
114. Id. at 7.
115. Id. at 16-17.
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required at state expense only when the state is a party.1 6 In
Washington, when the state is not a party, the court may order
the parties to submit to blood tests, but the court is required to
do so only when a party requests these tests.117 Therefore, an
indigent paternity defendant who is unrepresented s in an
action between private individuals may be unaware of the poten-
tially exculpatory evidence provided by blood testing.
Defendants may object to, rather than insist on, blood test-
ing. For example, in State v. Meacham,11 9 two Washington
defendants, in separate actions, objected to court-ordered blood
tests. The defendants asserted that such blood testing was
equivalent to an unreasonable search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment.1 20 The Washington Supreme Court recog-
nized that court-ordered blood tests are indeed searches.1 2
Nonetheless, a defendant's interests are less compelling than
those of the child. 122 The court reasoned that the fourth amend-
ment proscription is directed only to those searches that are
unreasonable: that is, those unjustified by the circumstances or
those carried out in an improper manner. 2 3 The court held that
under certain circumstances in paternity determinations, orders
for the withdrawal of blood were reasonable.124
Other procedural protection interests of the defendant arise
from the overlap of the civil and criminal cause of action in
paternity proceedings. The primary purpose behind the estab-
lishment of paternity statutes was not to punish a nonmarital
father but to compel him to support his offspring. 12 5 Thus, while
the earliest paternity cause of action arose from a criminal non-
116. In Little, the state was actively involved in pursuing a determination of pater-
nity for a particular AFDC recipient. The extent of the state's involvement gave rise to a
constitutional duty. Id. at 9-10.
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.100(1) (Supp. 1984). See supra note 104.
118. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
119. 93 Wash. 2d 735, 612 P.2d 795 (1980). In Meacham, two separate actions were
consolidated on appeal. In each case the state had brought an action against a putative
father who was then ordered to submit to the withdrawal of blood for testing to deter-
mine paternity. Each man resisted the court order, asserting that a compulsory blood
test violated his rights to personal privacy, freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and freedom of religion.
120. Id. at 736, 612 P.2d at 797.
121. Id. at 738, 612 P.2d at 798.
122. Id. at 741, 612 P.2d at 799.
123. Id. at 739, 612 P.2d at 798.
124. Id.
125. State v. Kline, 69 Wash. 2d 107, 109, 417 P.2d 348, 350 (1966) (object of the
proceeding is to ensure support of the child and not to punish defendant).
1985]
672 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 8:653
support statute,12 the current statutory cause of action is
civil. 127 A dangerous element exists in this dual system: one ele-
ment of a criminal action may be proved by a civil standard,
rather than by a criminal one. While the purpose of most pater-
nity actions is to identify the child's father and to compel sup-
port,1 28 other actions may be brought merely to ensure a child's
intestate inheritance,2 9 for example, or to secure a child's social
security benefits. 30 Therefore, some paternity actions pose no
threat to the defendant's liberty, as might be the situation in a
paternity action for criminal nonsupport.
1 31
The civil paternity determination is distinct from the crimi-
nal nonsupport action, and the nonsupport action affords the
defendant all criminal due process rights.13 2 However, because
nonsupport is quite simple to prove, full due process protections
are of little use in the criminal nonsupport action."'3 As the
defendant was afforded no counsel in the civil proceeding that
determined the fact of his parentage by a mere preponderance of
the evidence, the defendant's constitutional guarantee of due
process should prohibit the court from imposing criminal penal-
ties for nonsupport based on a prior determination of pater-
126. State v. Russell, 68 Wash. 2d 748, 753 n.7, 415 P.2d 503, 506-07 n.7 (1966)
(criminal nonsupport is proved if a parent fails to furnish necessary food, shelter, or
medical attention for child, regardless of the parent's marital status-past, present, or
future).
127. The filiation statute, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.24, which was superseded by the
UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.26 in 1976, was supported by case law
stating that the filiation proceeding is civil in nature, even though it is prosecuted in the
name of the state and contemplates the defendant's incarceration if necessary to enforce
compliance with the court's orders. See, e.g., State v. Speed, 96 Wash. 2d 838, 841-42,
640 P.2d 13, 15 (UPA did not convert filiation proceedings into a criminal prosecution),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 863 (1982); Yetter v. Commeau, 84 Wash. 2d 155, 162-63, 524 P.2d
901, 906 (1974) (the rules of civil procedure and usual evidentiary standards followed in
filiation proceedings apply under Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act
(URESA)).
128. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.26 (Supp. 1984). See supra note 27.
129. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.081 (Supp. 1984). See also supra note 31.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(A) (Supp. 1984) ("A State plan for child and spousal sup-
port must. . . provide that such State will undertake in the case of a child born out of
wedlock with respect to whom an assignment under section 602(a)(26) of this title is
effective, to establish the paternity of such child . . ").
131. See State v. Mottett, 73 Wash. 2d 114, 115, 437 P.2d 187, 188 (1968) (if defen-
dant is required to give bond and he fails to do so, he may be arrested and imprisoned).
See also supra note 77.
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.20.030 (1983). See also State v. Pearson, 13 Wash. App.
870, 873-74, 538 P.2d 567, 569 (1975) (as with other defendants, putative father permit-
ted to present proof of his willingness and ability to pay prior to court's requiring bond).
133. H. KRAUSE, supra note 107, at 154.
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nity.'3 4 Nonetheless, in Washington, a civil paternity determina-
tion is res judicata in a subsequent criminal nonsupport case."'a
Thus, one element of a criminal action may be proved with a
lower standard than that of "beyond a reasonable doubt."
To provide the defendant with full due process protections
in paternity determinations, the defendant must be permitted to
challenge a civil paternity judgment in the criminal nonsupport
proceeding. The defendant's criminal prosecution for nonsup-
port of a nonmarital child must rest on evidence of paternity
beyond a reasonable doubt. A prior civil adjudication of the
defendant's paternity of a particular child may be presented as
evidence of paternity in the criminal case, but it should not be
conclusive on the issue of paternity. s8
Finally, because the Washington Legislature does not pro-
vide counsel for indigent paternity defendants at state
expense, 37 several problems for the unrepresented defendant
can be anticipated and routinely prevented. First, if the pater-
nity defendant appears pro se, either because of indigency or by
choice, he is most likely unaware of the sharp differences in the
two available blood testing procedures. Not fully appreciating
the benefits of the two procedures, he may, if given an option,
choose the less expensive blood-group testing or no blood testing
at all. Thus, to provide the paternity defendant with the oppor-
tunity to offer exculpatory evidence, the court should inform the
defendant of the significant differences in result that may occur
in the two testing procedures and should order the HLA tests. 3 '
Second, if the paternity defendant is indigent, and if the
state is a party to the action, the court should routinely order
HLA testing to aid the state in carrying out its obligation to pro-
vide such tests. Because the right test results will compel dismis-
sal, the blood test easily can accomplish what the lawyer may
134. Id. But cf. State v. James, 38 Wash. App. 264, 272, 686 P.2d 1097, 1101 (1984)
(although the paternity adjudication makes possible a later order for contempt or willful
nonsupport, those subsequent actions must be based on the intervening, volitional act to
withhold support).
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.130(1) (1983) ("The judgment and order of the court
determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship shall be
determinative for all purposes.").
136. H. KRAUSE, supra note 107, at 158.
137. State v. James, 38 Wash. App. 264, 268, 686 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1984). See supra
notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.100(1) eases the way for the parties to admit and to
gain information about the blood test results.
19851
674 University of Puget Sound Law Review
not be able to do at all.
Third, if the parties choose an administrative hearing rather
than a trial, the relative informality may lull the unrepresented
defendant into believing that the consequences of such a pro-
ceeding are not serious. 13 9 For these reasons the paternity defen-
dant must be apprised of the benefits of administrative hearings
and of the serious, ongoing consequences of a paternity determi-
nation. Finally, the putative father should be encouraged to
retain counsel.
C. The State
The state, in addition to its interest in an accurate determi-
nation of paternity,140 has an interest in initiating paternity
actions to protect the public from the burden of supporting
nonmarital children 14  whose fathers are capable of providing
funds for their care, support, and education.'42 Once paternity
has been established, the state, through its statutory author-
ity, 43 has the power to bring an action against the child's father
to compel support.14
139. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
140. State v. James, 38 Wash. App. 264, 270, 686 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1984) (state's
interest in accurate paternity determinations is balanced by its interest in conducting
paternity proceedings as economically as possible, thus no right to appointed counsel in
paternity proceedings).
141. In New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, a New Jersey statute that permit-
ted the state to pay welfare benefits only to households that included marital children
was held unconstitutional. 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973). The Court ruled that the statute
invidiously discriminated against the families of nonmarital children. Id. The state's pay-
ment of welfare benefits turned upon the marital status of the parents and depended
upon a legal relationship between the parent and child, rather than on need. Id.
142. State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 102, 569 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1977) ("The State has
a compelling interest in assuring that the primary obligation for support of illegitimate
children falls on both natural parents rather than on the taxpayers of this state.")
(emphasis in original); State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 521, 537 P.2d 268, 278 (1975)
("The governmental interest in filiation proceedings is the need to insure that the bur-
den of supporting illegitimate children will be equitably shared by both of its parents
and will not be unnecessarily placed on the state."). But cf. State ex rel. Partlow v. Law,
39 Wash. App. 173, 177, 692 P.2d 863, 865 (1984) (income of the wife of man adjudged
father of nonmarital child considered in setting the amount of child support in paternity
action because related to father's ability to pay); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 38 Wash. App. 288,
301, 687 P.2d 223, 227 (1984) (Wash. UPA does not create an irrebuttable presumption
that parents have an equal duty of support).
143. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.20.330 (1983) (payment of public assistance creates an
assignment to DSHS by operation of law).
144. Under the filiation statute (formerly WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.24, now super-
seded by WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.26 (1983)), a cause of action was granted only to an
unmarried mother, her parents, or her guardian. Although the prosecuting attorney had
[Vol. 8:653
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Because the overwhelming number of paternity actions are
prosecuted by the state in an effort to recover funds expended
on AFDC children 45 and because most suspected fathers admit
to paternity without more evidence than the mother's accusa-
tion, 46 the state often may secure a support obligor who is not
actually the child's father. 147 In addition to this problem, partici-
pation in a trial is expensive and time-consuming. An adminis-
trative hearing, rather than a judicial proceeding, would advance
the interests of all parties in two situations: when the state, as a
party, is attempting to collect AFDC expenditures and in non-
AFDC cases when the parties so elect. Of course, certain proce-
dural safeguards must be guaranteed." 8
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS OF PATERNITY
The notion that administrative proceedings have a role in
paternity determinations is not new. In Taylor v. Morris14 9 and
Woolery v. Department of Social and Health Services,'5" the
State of Washington, through DSHS, sought an administrative
determination of paternity. The state asserted that the legisla-
ture had delegated implied authority to DSHS'5' to determine
the responsibility for prosecuting the action in the name of the state, the real parties in
interest were the complainant-mother and the child. State v. Casey, 7 Wash. App. 923,
926, 503 P.2d 1123, 1125 (1972). Even though the state had no independent right to
bring an action to establish paternity under the filiation statute, it could reach the issue
directly through other statutes. See State v. Russell, 68 Wash. 2d 748, 752, 415 P.2d 503,
506 (1966). Under Washington's version of the UPA, any interested party, including the
state and the Department of Social and Health Services, may bring an action to deter-
mine paternity. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.26.060 (1983).
145. See supra note 13.
146. See infra note 147. Even without a mother's accusation, one study found that
an estimated 18% of men who voluntarily admitted paternity were not the fathers of the
children in question. H. KRAUSE, supra note 107, at 108. Professor Krause suspects that
many men admit paternity because they had sexual access to the mother and either deny
or disbelieve that these mothers could have had concurrent relationships with other men.
Id.
147. There is a surprising lack of data to support the accuracy of the state's pater-
nity determinations. Professor Krause reported that 75-95% of putative fathers admit
paternity even before the case comes to trial. Krause, Child Support Enforcement, 15
FAM. L.Q. 349, 362 (1982). Yet a separate study based on blood tests revealed that in a
group of 1000 cases of disputed paternity, 39.6% of the accused men were not actually
the fathers of the children. H. KRAUSE, supra note 107, at 107-08.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 93-139.
149. 88 Wash. 2d 586, 564 P.2d 795 (1977).
150. 25 Wash. App. 762, 612 P.2d 1 (1980).
151. Taylor, 88 Wash. 2d at 588, 564 P.2d at 796; Woolery, 25 Wash. App. at 765,
612 P.2d at 2.
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parentage since the state required recoupment from the child's
father for expended AFDC payments. On both occasions, the
Washington courts denied that administrative determinations of
paternity are permitted because such power was not express or
implied in the statutory language. 152 In both Taylor and Wool-
ery, the courts held that the purpose of the statutes in ques-
tion 1 was to provide additional and effective procedures for
reaching the earnings and the property of a responsible parent
whose child was receiving public assistance. These courts deter-
mined that the statutes in question failed to provide for an addi-
tional cause of action to determine paternity. Therefore, to
ascertain parentage, DSHS was required to bring an action
under the UPA.154
The Taylor and Woolery decisions were based on the lack
of statutory powers, implied or express, provided in the language
and intent of the legislature. Although the delegation of power
to determine parentage is not found in the public assistance
statutes, administrative determinations of paternity are needed.
Unfortunately, the Taylor and Woolery courts did not reach the
question whether such an administrative procedure would be in
the parties' best interests.
All parties would benefit by the use of an administrative
procedure for paternity determinations. If the state could exert
direct control over monies applied toward identifying parentage,
administrative hearings would meet the needs of dependent
nonmarital children without the considerable delay15 5 these
cases now experience. Furthermore, the appointment of adminis-
trative law judges, who could specialize and acquire experience
by hearing a large volume of cases in a narrow area of the law,
would ensure consistent decisions. Finally, the proceeding would
be heard in a less formal, less threatening environment than that
152. Taylor, 88 Wash. 2d at 592, 564 P.2d at 798; Woolery, 25 Wash. App. at 764,
612 P.2d at 2.
153. In Woolery, the statutes in question were WASH. REV. CODE ch. 74.04 (governing
public assistance generally); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 74.08 (governing eligibility for public
assistance); and WASH. REV. CODE ch. 74.12 (governing the AFDC program). In Taylor,
the statute in question was WASH. REV. CODE ch. 74.20A (governing support for depen-
dent children).
154. Taylor, 88 Wash. 2d at 593, 564 P.2d at 799; Woolery, 25 Wash. App. at 764,
612 P.2d at 2.
155. One reason for delay in contested cases is court congestion. For example, in
Pierce County the average wait for a court date is 9 months. Telephone interview with




of a judicial proceeding, and would perhaps reduce the parties'
anxieties.
Although an administrative proceeding may be less formal
than a trial, its consequences are not less serious. Moreover, a
chance exists that hearsay might be admitted. 156 Therefore,
among the defendant's other procedural protections,'57 there
must be included an explanation that the administrative hearing
results are just as binding as those of a court. Thus, because of
the informal atmosphere, the possible admittance of hearsay,
and the different burdens of proof,' the defendant's civil pater-
nity determination should stand merely as evidence of paternity
in criminal nonsupport cases and not as a finding of fact.
Implementation of the recommended procedural safe-
guards-mandatory HLA blood testing for all disputed determi-
nations, civil paternity determinations to be used only as evi-
dence of paternity in a criminal action, and representation by
counsel when the defendant is indigent and due process
demands it-would greatly reduce the risk of an erroneous
result. These procedures would help ensure that the child's
father was identified, not just a father. By including an adminis-
trative hearing as the original fact-finding process, the legisla-
ture would continue to protect the defendant, while enabling
him to defend an action more quickly and less expensively.
Shorter delays and reduced costs would benefit all the parties,
while the HLA procedure would ensure the most accurate result.
V. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Parentage Act, adopted in Washington in
1976, regards the child in a paternity determination as the real
party in interest. The UPA also provides procedural safeguards
for paternity defendants. More safeguards are needed, however,
if the defendant is to have full protection.
The HLA blood testing provides the most accurate scientific
results in discovering parentage. When the defendant is indigent
and entitled to state-funded blood testing under the fourteenth
156. The circumstances of the hearsay are important in a court's decision whether
to admit the statement. See Guiles v. Department of Labor & Indus., 13 Wash. 2d 605,
612, 126 P.2d 195, 198 (1942) (in worker's compensation hearing, employee's widow testi-
fied regarding her husband's complaints; the court held that this information was admis-
sible and entitled to some weight if consistent with other evidence).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 93-139.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 125-36.
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amendment, the court should order only HLA testing. When the
defendant is adjudged the father of a particular child in a civil
proceeding, that judgment should serve only as evidence in a
later criminal nonsupport proceeding. If the defendant is indi-
gent and the circumstances of his case indicate that representa-
tion is necessary to due process, then he should be represented
by counsel.
The interests of all parties would better be served if, in a
paternity proceeding brought by the state to recover AFDC
expenditures, administrative determinations were permitted.
The administrative proceeding would promote the interests of
the child, the mother, the state, and the defendant: the child
would receive benefits sooner, the state would conserve financial
resources, and the defendant would receive the same safeguards
provided in a judicial determination.
Carol DeNardo Spoor
